This article reviews some of the theoretical notions and empirical phenomena which figure in current formal-semantic theories of focus. It also develops the connection between "alternative semantics" and "givenness" accounts of focus interpretation.
Introduction
The contemporary theoretical term focus originates in Halliday (1967) , who said that the capitalized phrases in sentences (1)-(4) have a grammatical property which he called information focus. In cases such as (1)- (2) , the location of focus is conditioned by how the sentence containing the focus fits into its context, here the question. The examples illustrate that if the questioned element is changed, the locus of focus changes in parallel. Strikingly, in other cases focus has a truth-conditional se- 
Grammatical representation of focus
Focus is a grammatical property which has a phonology (some kind of prominence) and a semantics and/or pragmatics (a topic which will be discussed later). In this respect, it is like content words or features such as tense, which also have an influence on both sides of the form/meaning correspondence. To link the two, it is usually assumed that focus is represented syntactically, by means of a syntactic feature or other piece of syntactic represenation. This move was made by Jackendoff (1972) , who introduced a syntactic feature which is written F. The F feature marks the focused phrase, and a phrase which is not marked with F is unfocused. Thus the focus feature is simply a binary-valued syntactic feature. (5) and (6) correspond to (1) and (2). The point of the F feature is to link up the phonology of focus with the semantics and pragmatics of focus. This is done with independent phonological and semantic principles which refer to the F feature. (7) is the phonological principle from Jackendoff (1972) . It says that F corresponds to stress prominence in a certain domain. Jackendoff's semantic principle was (8) . It generates a semantic object which has variables in the position of focus phrases. The Presupposition corresponding to (5) is an open proposition 'y painted the shed yesterday', with a variable y in the position of the focused phrase.
(7) If a phrase P is chosen as the focus of a sentence S, the highest stress in S will be on the syllable of P that is assigned highest stress by the regular stress rules. To avoid confusion with the standard notion of presupposition in natural language semantics, it is better to substitute another technical term for Jackendoff's Presupposition. Let's call this semantic object which has variables substituted for focused phrases the focus skeleton. As we will see, the focus skeleton is closely related to the constructs hypothesized in current semantic accounts of focus. A rough idea is that the focus skeleton functions as a schema which is matched to the discourse context, and which is referred to in the semantics of certain constructions.
Breadth of focus
The F feature resolves representationaly the question of what phrase or phrases are focused. In a given syntactic tree, the focused phrases are the phrases which bear the F feature. A focus on a relatively small phrase, such as a phrase with a single word as a terminal string, is said to be a "narrow" focus. However, breadth of focus can be constrained by phonological phrasing. In the narrow-focus example (11), it seems the major intonational break can follow either the subject Magdalena, or the verb fed.
(11) (Which cats did your sister Magdalena feed?)
MagdaLEna // fed FLUFfy .
MagdaLEna fed // FLUFfy .
If we switch focus to the VP as in (12), it seems that the pronunciation with the major phrase break after fed is impossible. That JOHN was at the party // is CERtain.
(15) That John F was at the party is certain.
On both phonological grounds, one can argue that the sentence S referred to in the constraint (7) must be the embedded sentence in this case. While John is more prominent than anything else in the embedded sentence, it is probably not more prominent than certain. Truckenbrodt (1995) American is the focus of the whole sentence in (15), because that would require that American has highest stress prominence in the whole sentence. Note that in this case, there is no embedded sentence, so there is no choice of a sentence for which the constraint (7) (17)a. Focus skeleton for embedded sentence in (14) 'y was at the party' b. Focus skeleton for matrix sentence in (14)
'that y was at the party is certain'
The dimension of variation which is illustrated in (17) While the notion of scope is in fact implicit in both the phonological constraint (7) and the semantic constraint (8), a syntactic representation of scope does not follow immediately from postulating an F feature. Rooth (1992) proposed that the scope of an F is fixed by a "focus interpretation" operator ∼ k, which also specifies an antecedent k for the focus skeleton. Chomsky (1970) suggested that the scope of focus is marked representationally by covert movement.
Schwartzschild (1999) made a more parsimonious proposal: in trees with nested configurations of F marking, one F delimits the scope of another. A representation for (15) where the scope of the focus on John is the embedded clause is (18). Effectively, the maximal scope of an F on a node α is the maximal phrase β which dominates α and is not F-marked. Since in (18) the embedded that-clause is F-marked but the embedded S is not, the scope is the embedded 
Focus anaphoricity
Focus anaphoricity is the hypothesis that the semantics and pragmatics of focus involves a relation to context which is a kind of anaphora. Suppose we put (18) back into its context, and add an index which indicates that the "antecedent" for the focus on John is the question. Then we arrive at something along the lines of (19), which gives one option using the representation where the scope of F is delimited by F, and another option where the scope is delimited by ∼. The rough idea is that the focus (or the focus interpretation operator) is In alternative-set focus, the antecedent denotes a set of propositions, or in a functional type system, a characteristic function of a set of propositions. We can conjecture that entailment semantics properly generalizes the representations licensed in alternative semantics, so that specific analyses which use alternative semantics can be ported to entailment semantics without changing the representation of the antecedents or the indexing relations. Some additional issues remain. Schwartzschild (1999) proposed that the entailment constraint is applied at any non-F-marked node, not just the maximal scope of focus as defined above. In (24) the entailment constraint would be applied at the VP level [fed Fluffy F ], as well as the S level. In such cases f is generated by existentially quantifying arguments. In this case this produces ∃x∃y[feed(x, y)], which is entailed by the same antecedent f . In this version of entailment semantics (which is the official version of Schwarzschild's givenness semantics), one
should not speak of the unique scope of a focus, but of the possibly multiple levels where the entailment constraint is applied. These are simply the non-Fmarked phrases.
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